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          by  
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        Faculty of Economics 
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I.Introduction  
 
Among the non-socialist developing countries, the Indian economy 
has long been regarded as being a classical case of heavy state 
intervention. In the eyes of the powerful and influential neo 
liberal critics of the country's economic development, particularly 
the Bretton Woods institutions, this intervention, if not 
disastrous, has certainly been inefficient. It is thought to have 
resulted in a sluggish pace of industrialization and a relatively 
slow growth of the economy.  The majority of India's indigenous 
economists on the other hand, although critical of many aspects 
of the state planned economic regime, generally regard it in a more 
favourable light.   
 
The classical Indian state directed industrialization model held 
sway for three decades, from 1950 to 1980.  The model began to erode 
in the 1980s
2
. After the elections of 1991, the new Congress party 
minority government of Narasimhan Rao was faced with an acute 
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external short term liquidity crisis. The government sought 
assistance from the IMF to cope with the situation and to restore 
confidence.  It also announced at that time its intention to more 
or less abandon altogether the traditional model.  This paper, 
however, concentrates on this traditional model which has dominated 
Indian economic development over most of the post independence 
period.  The paper sets out the main lines of the arguments of the 
critics as well as the proponents of the model, and provides an 
assessment of their relative merits. 
 
Section 2 outlines the main features of the Indian industrialization 
model.  Section 3 considers various indicators of the success or 
failure of the model. Section 4 examines the case of the critics. 
 Section 5 outlines the counterarguments of the proponents. Section 
6 provides an overall conclusion.  Also, in addition, it briefly 
examines the question whether a) the country would have done better 
under an alternative industrialization model and, b) whether such 
a model was feasible in the Indian circumstances.  This discussion 
is specifically directed towards the practicality and wisdom of 
the East Asian model for India.  Such counterfactual speculation 
is not simply an intellectual exercise, but has an important bearing 
on the industrial policy issues confronting the Indian economy in 
the changed circumstances of the 1990s. 
 
II.The Indian Model of Planned Economic Development 
 
Among the mixed economy third world nations, India pioneered 
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development planning and instituted, beginning in 1952, a set of 
five year plans for planned economic development of the country
3
. 
The inspiration for Indian planning came from the Soviet Union which 
was thought to have successfully achieved industrialization of the 
country in a relatively short span of time. The "fabian socialist" 
leadership of the newly independent India, personified by Nehru, 
sought to adapt the Soviet model to the requirements of a mixed 
economy and a democratic polity in order to provide a "third" way 
of economic development for nations emerging from the colonial rule. 
 
In keeping with the ideals of the top leadership, the Indian Plans 
were designed to bring about economic and social development within 
a "socialist" framework. The plans pursued multiple objectives of 
industrialization, raising per capita incomes  and equity in the 
distribution of gains from economic progress. They also sought to 
reduce existing concentration of economic power and to achieve a 
better regional distribution of industrial development. As far as 
economic strategy is concerned, the following elements were the 
most important during the 1950s, 1960s, and most of the 1970s: 
 
-First, The indian planners emphasized the role of heavy industry 
in economic development and sought to build up as rapidly as 
possible the capital goods sector. 
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-Second, the plans envisaged a leading role for the public sector 
in this structural transformation of the economy. Not only 
was the government to play a dominant role in infrastructure 
investments (railways, electricity, etc.), but many 
industries, particularly in the capital goods sector, were 
exclusively reserved for development by the state. 
 
-Third, major investments in the private sector were to be carried 
out, not by the test of private profitability, but according 
to the requirements of the overall national plan. For example, 
car production might have been highly profitable, but the 
manufacturers were prohibited from expanding output since the 
use of scarce resources for the production of such luxuries 
was socially less beneficial than, say, for the production 
of tractors or ploughs. 
 
-Fourth, the plans emphasized technological self-reliance, and for 
much of the period, an extreme inward orientation in the sense 
that if anything could be produced in the country, it should 
not be imported
4
 
 
As is well known, the economic rationale for this 
capital-goods-biased industrial strategy was provided by P.C. 
                     
    
4
During the late 1970s and in the 1980s, the concept of 
self-reliance was redefined in less stringent terms. It 
was interpreted to mean an "economic base that is 
sufficiently strong and internationally competitive to 
generate the export earnings required to pay for needed 
imports of goods that cannot economically be produced 
domestically". See further Byrd [1990]. 
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Mahalanobis. In the Mahalanobis [1963] model, essentially that of 
a closed economy, the development of the capital goods industry 
emerges as the main constraint on economic growth. This model of 
internal technological and heavy industry development could be 
rationalized for an open economy of the size of India if one 
envisages slow rates of growth of the world economy and trade, and, 
perhaps, falling commodity prices in world markets. Alternatively, 
it could also be justified in more orthodox terms along the lines 
that India's dynamic comparative advantage was in industries like 
steel for which the country has available the necessary raw 
materials in close proximity to each other (thus reducing the costs 
of transportation). 
 
An important drawback of the heavy-industry-biased industrial 
strategy is that it conflicts with the employment objectives 
embodied in the five-year plans. The plans sought to square this 
circle by providing external and internal protection to a number 
of small-scale and cottage enterprises for which the capital-labour 
ratio was very low. Thus, for instance, modern textile factories 
were limited in how much they could expand their output so that 
they would not compete with the high-cost products of the cottage 
industries. 
 
In implementing this industrial strategy and particularly in making 
the private sector conform to the requirements of the plans, the 
government used a wide variety of measures. The most important of 
these were:  
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-Industrial licensing. For much of the period, this entailed that 
any enterprise which wished to manufacture a new article or 
sought a substantial expansion of its existing capacity had 
to obtain a license from the relevant government authority. 
 
-Strict regime of import controls. A "red book" listed the whole 
range of items for which imports were prohibited altogether, 
usually to provide protection for new infant industries. In 
practice, it often meant that as long as there was "indigenous 
availability" of a particular manufactured product in the 
country, it was protected from foreign competition whatever 
the costs of domestic production. 
 
-Subsidization of exports through special measures. The adverse 
effect of import quotas and tariffs on the exporting industries 
was sought to be alleviated by a variety of special provisions 
and subsidies for exporters (e.g., the import entitlement 
scheme). 
 
-Administered prices. In addition to the licensing requirements 
for industrial production and expansion, the government also 
fixed market prices for a range of "crucial" or "essential" 
products, for example, steel, cement, sugar, aluminum, etc.. 
 
-Foreign investment policy. Investments by multinationals were 
generally subject to strict controls  - much more stringent 
than those for the national companies.  
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Finally, it is important to observe that considered in technical 
or economic terms alone, the above economic strategy chosen by the 
Indian leadership was by no means the only feasible one available. 
In the public debate that took place at the time of the formulation 
of the early Five Year Plans, two leading Indian economists, Vakil 
and Brahamananda [1956] advocated an alternative, more orthodox, 
strategy. This involved building on India's competitive advantage 
in textiles. After the war,the country had emerged as one of the 
leading exporters of textiles in the world. Vakil and Brahamananda 
favoured concentration on textile exports, on the development of 
light industries, and reliance on market forces to achieve 
industrial development. This kind of alternative strategy was 
deliberately shunned by the Indian leadership in favour of state 
planned industrialization. 
 
III.Economic and Industrial Performance  
 
There is a large debate on the question of how the overall results 
of Indian planned development over the last four decades should 
be assessed. The proponents of  Indian planning argue that in the 
1970s and 1980s, when the world economy was subject to severe 
turbulence, the overall economic performance of the country was 
very creditable. India has recorded a trend increase in its rate 
of economic growth since 1973. Between 1963 and 1973, India's rate 
of growth of GDP was about half as high as that of other Asian and 
Latin American countries (see table 1). During the 1980s, the  
 
 Table 1: 
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 GDP IN ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
 (Real Rates of Growth) 
 
 1963-1973 1973-1979 1980-1990 
ASIA    
China 8.6 4.9 9.5 
India 3.4 4.3 5.3 
Indonesia 6.9 7.1 5.5 
Korea 9.6 9.8 9.7 
Malaysia 6.6 7.3 5.2 
Pakistan 6.2 5.0 6.3 
Philippines 5.2 6.4 0.9 
Sri Lanka 4.5 5.0 4.0 
Taiwan 10.7 9.2 -.- 
Thailand 8.0 7.7 7.6 
    
  Median 6.7 6.7 5.3 
    
LATIN AMERICA    
Argentina 4.8 1.8 -0.4 
Bolivia 4.7 4.7 -0.1 
Brazil 8.3 6.9 2.7 
Chile 3.6 2.7 3.2 
Colombia 5.9 5.0 3.7 
Ecuador 7.2 6.8 2.0 
Mexico 7.8 5.7 1.0 
Peru 3.9 2.4 -0.3 
Venezuela   5.2 5.6 1.0 
    
  Median 5.2 5.0 1.0 
Source:  World Bank, various issues 
Indian growth rate rose to the average level of the Asian countries 
and was way above that of the Latin American countries, most of 
which suffered a sharp setback to their economic prospects. Because 
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it was able to significantly increase its trend rate of growth, 
India could be regarded as having been strikingly successful in 
coping with international economic fluctuations. The proponents 
of the Indian development model argue that this ability of the 
economy to withstand world economic shocks has largely been due 
to the country's long-term strategy of import substitution and 
technological self-reliance.
5
 
 
In contrast, a far harsher assessment of the overall Indian  record 
comes from The Economist: "The hopes of 1947 have been betrayed. 
India, despite all its advantages and a generous supply of aid from 
the capitalist West (whose 'wasteful' societies it deplored), has 
achieved less than virtually any comparable third-world country. 
The cost in human terms has been staggering. Why has Indian 
development gone so tragically wrong?  The short answer is this: 
the state has done far too much and far too little. It has crippled 
the economy, and burdened itself nearly to breaking point, by taking 
on jobs it has no business doing."
6
   
 
                     
    
5
The liquidity crisis of 1991 cannot be ascribed to external 
shocks. Nor did it arise from any inherent features of 
the planned industrialization model. It was primarily 
due to uncharacteristically lax fiscal control exercised 
by weak minority governments at the end of the 1980s. 
The crisis was abetted by the uncertain political 
situation in the country and the state of turmoil caused 
by the "anti-reservation" agitation.  This led to 
withdrawal of capital by non-resident Indians, thus 
precipitating the liquidity crisis. 
    
6
The Economist, "A Survey of India", May 4, 1991, p.9.  For 
more academic assessments of the Indian economic 
performance along the same lines, see for example Lal 
[1988], Ahluwalia [1985, 1991]. 
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One way of assessing the record of state planned industrialization 
in India is to compare the actual outcomes with the planned targets. 
This comparison (see table 2) shows that the actual rate of growth 
of industrial production in each five year plan was below the target 
rate except for the Seventh Plan.  The average industrial growth 
rate over the whole period, 1950 to 1990, is about 6.2 percent 
relative to the average of approximately 8 percent, projected in 
the plans. Mohan [1992] estimates that had the planned 
industrialized targets been consistently achieved, the Indian 
overall per capita annual economic growth would have been 1.2 to 
1.4 percentage points higher than it otherwise would have been. 
  
 
Despite the improved performance of the Indian economy after 1973, 
in comparative international terms, the overall long term Indian 
economic and industrial record does not compare favourably with 
that of the successful Asian countries. The speed of Indian 
industrialization has been much slower than that of countries like 
Korea, Taiwan or China. The relatively slow growth of the economy 
has also meant that the pace of structural change has been much 
slower in India than in these other economies [Singh and Ghosh, 
1988]. Equally significantly, the critics of Indian development  
 
 Table 2: 
 
ACTUAL AND TARGETED RATES OF GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT 
 
Plan Period Target Actual Deviation in 
Per Cent 
First Plan (1951-56) - 7.3 - 
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Second Plan (1956-61) 8.3
1
  6.6 -25.75 
Third Plan (1961-66) 11.1
1
   9.0 -23.33 
Fourth Plan (1969-74) 8 to 10 4.7 -51.49 
Fifth Plan (1974-1979) 7.0 5.9 -18.64 
Sixth Plan (1980-85) 8.0
2
 6.4 -25.00 
Seventh Plan (1985-90)
3
 8.0 8.5 +5.88 
 
1/Envisaged increase in index of industrial production. 
2/Average rate of growth for the first four years of the plan. 
3/The target for the Sixth Plan as given in the Seventh Plan document, however, is 7 per cent. 
 
Source: Mani, 1992, Table 1. 
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rightly point out that the country's performance in terms of 
literacy, education, and health has been much worse than that of 
many other developing countries, not just the leading Asian 
economies. The critics also point to the fact that in comparative 
terms, India has not performed at all well with respect to the 
eradication of poverty  - which was one of the major goals of the 
whole Indian development effort. Similarly, it is argued that the 
five year plans have not been successful either in reducing 
concentration of economic power or in bringing about a more 
equitable regional distribution of economic and industrial 
development [Mani, 1992; Byrd, 1990]. 
 
However, as Singh and Ghosh [1988] note, it is inadequate to consider 
India's industrial progress in purely quantitative terms.  The 
quality and the depth of Indian industrialization has been 
impressive in a number of ways. Despite all its shortcomings , the 
concept of technological self reliance has meant that the country 
has one of the largest pools of trained technical manpower in the 
world.  Among the third world semi-industrial countries, by the 
1970s, India became a leading exporter of technology.  Lall (1984) 
assembled the best available information on technology exports of 
the leading NICs.  This data shows that in industrial project 
exports, the leading exporter was India, followed at a large 
distance by Korea and Brazil.  In non-industrial civil construction 
project exports, by far the most important country was Korea, 
followed by India and Brazil.  Similarly UNIDO (1984) statistics 
on the comparative development of the key machine tool industry 
in the leading NICs reveal that India has been more successful in 
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this area than most other NICS.  In 1979-80, India exported a 
greater proportion of its machine tool output than either Mexico, 
Brazil or Korea.  Although in relative terms, India's exports were 
lower than Argentina's, its machine tool imports were considerably 
smaller than those of the latter country.  A good indication of 
the depth of India's industrial development is indicated by the 
fact that it is able to build nuclear power stations on its own. 
As the Financial Times noted, in the mid 1980s, India was only one 
of the six countries in the world which possessed that capacity. 
 The country also had substantial capacity for building thermal 
and hydroelectric stations. 
 
IV.Planned Industrial Regime and Economic Performance:  The Case 
of the Critics 
 
An important analytical question which arises in assessing the 
success or failure of India's state led economic development is 
to ask to what extent the country's observed economic performance 
is due to the characteristics of the development strategy as opposed 
to factors external to the developmental model.  What, in other 
words, is the nature of the links between the overall economic 
performance and the industrial regime?  Mrs. Isher J. Ahluwalia, 
the leading contemporary critic of India's planned 
industrialization, ascribes, what in her view is the country's poor 
overall industrial record, to particular features of the industrial 
regime. Specifically, she calls attention to the following adverse 
consequences of the Indian model. 
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(a)Barriers to entry into individual industries that limited the 
possibility of domestic competition. 
 
(b)Indiscriminate and indefinite protection of domestic industries 
from foreign competition. 
 
(c)The adverse effects of protecting small-scale industries and 
regional dispersal of growth on the choice of the optimal scale 
of production. 
 
(d)Barriers to exit by not allowing firms, even when they were non 
viable to close down, and the failure to move the resources 
to an alternative growing industry. 
 
(e)Administrative hurdles inherent in a system of physical 
controls. 
 
(f)Increased incentives for rent seeking activities that resulted 
in a dampening entrepreneurship.  
 
(g)Little or no incentive to upgrade technology.  
     
Other critics (for example, the World Bank) have added to this 
formidable list. 
 
(h)Adverse effects of universal credit rationing through the 
nationalized banking system. 
 
 
 
15 
(i)Poor performance of public sector enterprises. 
 
The critics suggest that these factors are largely responsible not 
only for the low, long run growth of India's industrial economy 
but more importantly for the deceleration in the manufacturing 
growth rate between 1965 and 1975. Manufacturing expanded at an 
average rate of 6.2 percent per annum between 1955 and 1965;  
however, the corresponding average growth rate in the following 
decade (1965 to 1975) was only 3.3 percent. Since 1975, 
manufacturing production has increased at a much faster pace: the 
growth rate rose to 4.5 percent in the period 1975-1976 to 1980-1981 
period and to nearly 8 percent during the 1980s. The critics of 
the traditional industrial regime have ascribed this improvement 
to the gradual relaxation of industrial controls that began in the 
late 1970s. 
 
In the view of the critics, the precise link between the industrial 
policy regime and the deceleration in industrial growth between 
the mid-1960s an mid-1970s is provided by the increases in capital 
output ratios and a reduction in the growth rates of labour and 
total factor productivity in Indian industry during this period 
[Ahluwalia, 1985, 1991; World Bank, 1985, 1986]. Ahluwalia suggests 
that with the relaxation of the planned industrial regime, these 
microeconomic indicators of economic efficiency have shown 
significant improvement during the last decade. 
 
V.External and Internal Shocks, Government Macroeconomic  policy 
and Industrial Growth 
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It is nominally conceded by the critics of the planned industrial 
regime that weaknesses in areas other than trade and industrial 
policy may also be responsible for the observed decline in the rate 
of growth of Indian manufacturing industry in the decade, mid-1960s 
to mid-1970s.  Following the extensive literature on the subject, 
the critics do call attention to the role of such factors as (a) 
the slow rate of growth of demand for industrial output and (b) 
the low rate of investment in infrastructure (e.g., railways, power) 
during the relevant period, which too could cause poor industrial 
performance. Nevertheless, they seem to regard the industrial and 
trade policy regime to be the main culprit. 
 
Singh and Ghosh [1988] argue, however, that the two factors (a) 
and (b) above, rather than the trade and industrial policy regime, 
may be entirely responsible for the deceleration in industrial 
growth during 1965-75. The period coincided with at least three 
major shocks to the economy: the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and its 
aftermath, the Bangladesh war and the 1973 oil price increase. The 
Indo-Pakistan war led to the suspension of foreign aid which was 
only resumed after the devaluation of the rupee in 1966. To cope 
with the inflation arising from droughts and bad harvests of 1965-66 
and 1966-67, the government had adopted a restrictive fiscal policy. 
The consolidated government deficit was reduced from Rs 4 billion 
in 1965-66 to Rs 0.70 billion in 1969-70. This, together with the 
reduction in aid, led to a trend fall in investment, particularly 
in transport and communication, power and water supply [Joshi and 
Little, 1987]. 
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The Bangladesh war of 1971 involved a rise in defence expenditure, 
a costly government programme to help with the 10 million refugees 
from East Pakistan and another suspension of aid. Moreover, 
agricultural production, which had increased substantially during 
the 1960s, faltered in the early 1970s. Unfortunately for India, 
the harvest failures coincided with the huge rise in world wheat 
prices which began in the summer of 1972. 
 
Thus, the first oil shock which led to a four-fold increase in the 
price of oil between September 1973 and April 1974, came at a time 
when the economy was already in serious difficulties. As the Indian 
economy is relatively closed, the impact of the change in the terms 
of trade on the GDP was comparatively small; however, the balance 
of payments and financing repercussions were very large. As a 
proportion of GDP, the current deficit increased from an average 
of 0.45 percent of GDP during the three years 1971-74 to 1.4 percent 
of GDP in 1974-74. More relevantly for a low trading economy, the 
deficit as a proportion ot total exports of goods and services rose 
over the same period from about 8 percent to 25 percent. In order 
to cope with the pre-oil shock inflation and the effects of the 
oil-shock itself, the government introduced a highly deflationary 
fiscal and monetary policy.  A number of measures were taken in 
1974 to reduce private disposable income and to cut the central 
and the state governments fiscal deficits.  The public sector 
investment in real terms fell slightly in 1973-74, and by more than 
10% in 1974-75. (Ahluwalia, 1986). 
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In view of (i) the leading role of the public sector in Indian 
industry and (ii) the deflation and macroeconomic fluctuations 
arising from the shocks of the two wars and the oil price rise of 
1973, it is not surprising that the there should have been a trend 
fall in the rate of growth of Indian manufacturing production 
between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s. The relatively slow and 
fluctuating rate of growth of demand, which was the consequence 
of these macroeconomic shocks, would in itself be adequate to 
explain the poor industrial performance without invoking the 
alleged microeconomic inefficiencies of the trade and industrial 
policy regime. Moreover, to the extent that the slow rate of growth 
of demand affects capacity utilisation and capacity creation, the 
macroeconomic shocks outlined above clearly have an adverse effect 
on these microeconomic variables as well. 
 
With respect to the second broad area of the critics' argument  
-namely, that the improvement in Indian industrial performance 
during the 1980s is due to the gradual introduction of internal 
and external liberalization measures -  Singh and Gosh [1988] point 
out that the stance of fiscal and monetary policy after the second 
oil shock was rather different from that following the oil price 
increase of 1973-74. Instead of deflation, the government 
deliberately followed an expansionary fiscal and monetary policy 
and tried to increase public investment. As M.S. Ahluwalia [1986] 
observed: 
 
"The behavior of public investment after the second oil shock 
was in marked contrast to the experience after the first 
oil shock and reflects a basic difference in the stance 
of macroeconomic policy. On the earlier occasion there 
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had been a shift to a restrictive macroeconomic policy 
principally because of perceived dangers of inflation 
and this policy had depressed public investment in real 
terms ... However the approach to controlling inflation 
on this occasion (i.e. after 1979) placed much more 
emphasis on removing short-term and medium-term supply 
bottlenecks. One reason for this change of emphasis is 
that the balance of macroeconomic policy was set in the 
light of priorities outlined in the Sixth Five-Year Plan 
which covered the period 1980-81 to 1984-85. The plan 
emphasized the importance of investments in several 
critical areas, especially in the energy, transport 
infrastructure." 
 
By traditionally prudent Indian standards, the government fiscal's 
stance was overly expansionary for most of the 1980s, culminating 
in a budget deficit of about 8 percent of GDP by 1990. Singh and 
Ghosh note that the significant acceleration in Indian industrial 
growth during the last decade was achieved, unlike in the second 
half of the 1970s, at the expense of a serious deterioration in 
the current balance and a sharp increase in the country's debt 
service ratio. They warned that such a fast pace of the rate of 
growth of demand could not be maintained for very long.  
 
Osmani (1993) provides powerful support for the foregoing analysis 
which stresses the role of internal and external shocks and their 
macroeconomic policy consequences in generating the observed time 
pattern of Indian industrial growth over the last four decades, 
i.e., high growth in the Nehru-Mahalanobis period (to use Osmani's 
phrase) 1952-65, followed by relative stagnation in the middle 
period, 1965-75, followed further by high growth again in the 1980s. 
 He complements the Singh and Ghosh study by considering not just 
the time path of overall industrial growth but also its composition 
by industry.  The deceleration in industrial growth in the middle 
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period did not uniformly affect all industrial sectors.  Osmani 
notes that compared with the first period, the average growth rate 
of the capital and intermediate goods sectors fell by more than 
half in the second period.  The consumer durables faired only a 
little better, but the consumer non-durables slowed down only 
marginally from 5.0% per annum to 4.8%.  However, the recovery in 
the third period was led by the consumer goods sectors, both durables 
and non-durables.  Consumer durables reverted back to the growth 
rate of the first period; the non-durables reached an all time high. 
 In contrast, capital and intermediate goods sectors recorded only 
marginal improvement in the 1980s; as a result their growth rates 
have remained well below those attained in their heyday of the 
Nehru-Mahalanobis period. 
 
Osmani's examination of these changes in the overall, subsectoral 
and individual industry growth rates leads him to the conclusion 
that the variations in the government's macroeconomic policy stance 
provides the only consistent explanation for the observed facts. 
 Other theories, not just the "microeconomic inefficiencies" ones 
of the mainstream critics outlined earlier, but also those of the 
Marxist economists (which usually run in terms of inequalities in 
income distribution generated by the political economy of growth 
under the Nehru-Mahalanobis model
7
) simply do not accord with the 
data. 
 
VI. Conclusion: The Indian industrialization model versus the East 
                     
    
7
There is a large literature here.  For a recent review, see 
Sandesra (1992).  See also a discussion in Ahluwalia (1985). 
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Asian alternative 
 
In the light of the foregoing analysis we can arrive at the following 
overall assessment of the Indian state led industrialization model. 
First, over the last two decades, the Indian economy has shown an 
impressive ability to withstand external economic shocks. Although 
India suffered a decline in its rate of growth between 1965 and 
1975 as a result of the two wars and the first oil shock, the 
dispruption in the tempo of economic activity was nowhere as great 
as that experienced by the Latin American economies during the 
1980s. The latter were much more integrated with the world economy 
in terms of trade, and particularly finance, than the Indian 
economy. (Singh, 1993a) 
 
Secondly, if we take a long term view of Indian economic development 
over the last four decades as a whole, contrary to the Economist, 
the record is far from being disasterous.  It is clearly not 
outstanding - it is about average for the developing countries for 
Asia (the most successful of the three developing continents).  
The central analytical question which this raises is:  could India 
have done better under a different economic or political regime? 
Although there cannot be any conclusive answer to such a question, 
the intellectual exercise is interesting and important, as it bears 
on the future policy lessons of the Indian story so far.  
 
The orthodox response to the above question is an unequivical "yes". 
It is argued that the country has an enormous entrepreneurial talent 
and the role of the state has essentially been to thrwart this talent 
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from achieving its full potential. So if the state had not been 
heavily interventionist, but instead had assumed a "market 
friendly" night watchman status, the economy would have done much 
better. Similarly, it is suggested that keeping the Indian economy 
relatively closed to the international product and financial 
markets has been a costly mistake. This has resulted in myriad 
inefficiencies, slow technical progress and hence, "inefficient" 
and sluggish growth. 
 
This line of reasoning is unconvincing since recent scholarship
8
 
shows quite conclusively that in the outstandingly successful East 
Asian economies of not just socialist China, but also capitalist 
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the state has played a pivotal role, 
in a wide variety of ways, in bringing about rapid 
industrialization. It has pursued in each of these countries a 
vigorous and aggressive industrial policy to carry out the required 
structural transformation of the economy.  The government has 
"guided" the market, and not followed a hands off market friendly 
approach. Moreover, these highly successful East Asian economies 
did not attempt a deep and unconditional integration with the world 
economy.  Rather they sought a strategic integration, that is they 
integrated in the direction and to the extent that it was necessary 
for promoting national economic growth.
9
  
 
So then the relevant question becomes: could the Indian state have 
                     
    
8
  See for example, Wade (1990), Amsden (1989), Singh (1993). 
    
9
For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Singh (1993b). 
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acted to foster economic development in the same way as did the 
state in Taiwan, Korea or Japan? Many Indian intellectuals answer 
this question in the negative on the grounds that the Indian state 
lacks the "autonomy" to implement a Korean or Japanese style of 
industrial policy.
10
  Bardhan (1984), (1992) for example, 
characterizes the Indian polity as being in a class stalemate 
between the dominant classes.  In the pluralistic Indian democracy, 
it is argued that none of these classes - landlords, businessmen 
and professional and technical elite - is strong enough to capture 
the state for itself, or to enforce its will on the others.  The 
net result is a plethora of state subsidies and handouts to various 
political groups and special interests, rather than a purposive 
attempt at rapid industrialization or faster economic development. 
 In economic terms this means that the Indian economy is confined 
to a low level equilibrium trap.
11
  
 
This theory undoubtedly contains important insights into the Indian 
political economy.  However, it is also not without shortcomings, 
and is therefore not fully persuasive.  Today, the Indian 
government is indeed very weak but it is not a static situation. 
There were periods of greater autonomy - for example, the Nehru 
era of the 1950s, when there was a national consensus on certain 
                     
    
10
  Although Japan, Korea and Taiwan differ in some respects 
in the economic policies that they have followed, but 
there are also important similarities. Taiwan and Korea 
have tried to emulate the Japanese model in significant 
ways.  See further, Singh (1993). 
    
11
In Bardhan's (1992) words: "The Indian public economy has 
thus become an elaborate network of patronage and 
subsidies." 
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developmental goals. Similarly, at different times, Rajiv Gandhi 
and Indra Gandhi had overwhelming majorities in the Indian 
parliament, allowing them in principle to push through and implement 
a better developmental program. After all, Indra Gandhi, despite 
the class stalemate, did manage to nationalize the Indian banks. 
 
In view of the rather different history and the institutional 
circumstances of India, clearly, not all aspects of the East Asian 
model could have been replicated in that country.  Nevertheless, 
important and useful lessons could have been learned from the East 
Asian experience and implemented in the country during varous phases 
of strong government in the last forty years. Once implemented and 
sucessful, they could have generated positive feedback dynamics 
of their own leading to further autonomy for the state.  To 
illustrate, an outstanding feature of the East Asian economies like 
Japan and Korea, is that although they protected their industries 
from external competition, they also greatly encouraged exports. 
 During the high growth periods in these two countries (Japan, 
1950-73; and Korea, 1970-82) the government, in return for the 
protection being afforded to the firms, set them various performance 
standards, most notably in relation to exports and world market 
shares.  Thus the Japanese and Korean firms were obliged to use 
their profits from the protected home market to invest and to capture 
export markets.  Companies in these countries came to recognize 
that to move forward, to have access to foreign technology, 
licenses, etc., they had to export.  Lall (1987) and Bhagwati 
suggest that all that the East Asian governments did was to provide 
a neutral trading regime, i.e., one in which the incentive to sell 
 
 
25 
in the home market was the same as to sell abroad.  This view is 
however, contested by a number of economists who suggest that in 
fact what the East Asian governments did was to discriminate 
positively in favor of exports.
12
 
 
In contrast, the incentive system for the large Indian firms with 
potential to export has pointed in the opposite direction for most 
of the last four decades.  As noted earlier, to offset the biases 
of protection and import controls, the Indian government 
periodically provided special incentives and subsidies for 
exporters.  However, until the 1980s they were never adequate to 
fully offset the bias of the protectionist trade regime. 
 
The important question is, why were the exports not given the 
attention and the incentives accorded to them in the East Asian 
countries.  For had the exports been given proper priority, in view 
of India's past history of exporting and the existance of large 
business groups, there is no reason to believe the country would 
not have been able to maintain its prewar share in world manufactured 
exports even if it had not been as spectacularly successful as the 
East Asian NICs.  Quite apart from the advantages for exporting 
provided by the ready availability of large private business groups 
(they did not have to be created almost from scratch as in Korea, 
for example), India's historic links with the Middle Eastern 
countries (one of the fastest growing markets in the 1970s) and 
the large Indian diaspora abroad, provided the country with special 
                     
    
12
See for example Chang (1993); Amsden (1989); Scott (1992). 
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opportunities for exporting.  Had such opportunities been realized 
and India been able to achieve a trend increase in exports, it would 
have helped alleviate the chronic balance of payments constraint. 
 This in turn would have allowed the economy to move along a higher 
growth trajectory compared with its actual record.  It would also 
have provided the potential for the positive feedback mechanism 
referred to earlier. 
 
So the important question is, why were the exports neglected or 
not given the attention that they deserved.  It will be difficult 
to argue that it was the interest groups or the class stalemate 
which prevented the Indian planners from vigorously pursuing 
exports.  There are however other reasons which are more likely 
and are more persuasive. 
 
The first is clearly the large country syndrome - that India is 
a big country with a large market.  It does not have to worry about 
exports.  The second reason is, India's colonial past and the 
popular perception, widely shared by the ruling elite that foreign 
trade was exploitative and was the precursor to the British colonial 
domination of the country.  Thirdly, it is important to take into 
account the anti-private business bias and the ideology of the 
Fabian socialist leadership of Nehru and the later Indian leaders. 
 This made them emphasise public enterprise and seizing the 
"commanding heights" of the economy under public ownership.  At 
a deeper level, this ideology also prevented the Indian leadership 
from forging a genuine partnership with private business in the 
way that the East Asian economies did.  Such a partnership is 
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clearly essential for the successful functioning of a mixed economy. 
 There is no reason to believe that the leadership could not have 
created such a partnership and won public support for it during 
periods of large parliamentary majorities and  strong government. 
 However, for this to have happened would have required a wide 
measure of ideological flexibility which the Indian ruling elite 
clearly did not possess.  The contrast between the post-Mao Chinese 
leadership and the Indian ruling circles, in this respect, could 
not be more striking. 
 
The neglect of exports is one, but a very important example, of 
the intellectual failure of the ruling elite to correctly appreciate 
the world around it, rather than a problem which arose from the 
lack of autonomy of the state.  There are other similar examples 
concerning technology imports, foreign direct investment, etc., 
which it can be shown, also point in the same direction.  Of course, 
it is possible to plead extenuating circumstances for these failings 
in terms of the Indian colonial history as mentioned above (see 
also Mohun, 1992), but that does not alter the fact of these 
failures. Similarly, it may be that the Indian state did not have 
the autonomy to orchestrate oligopolistic investment races or to 
set export targets for firms in the the East Asian manner - even 
that is not certain - but it definitely could have learned other 
useful lessons from, for example, the Japanese MITI, particularly 
the latter's role in continously building a social concensus around 
the required developmental policies as world circumstances changed. 
 In other words, the essential point is not that a subset of MITI 
type sensible policies could not have been implemented because of 
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lack of autonomy of the state, but simply that they were not 
implemented because of intellectual failings on the part of the 
ruling elite.  
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